The attacker does not want your funds, they want to be you

Most protocols in this list can be attacked by draining a pool. A smart wallet usually cannot. There is no pool, only one user's assets behind one authorisation model.

So the threat model inverts. The goal is not to move money directly, it is to become an address the wallet believes is allowed to move it. Every question below is a variation on that.

Where the wallet keeps its trust

Sequence V3 does not store its signer set on chain. It commits to a Merkle root of its configuration and validates signers against proofs when they are used, which keeps deployment and updates cheap across many chains.

It also means the security of the wallet reduces to the correctness of a Merkle verification. That is a good trade, and it concentrates the risk somewhere very specific.

Four ways to become a signer

Forge a proof. Can a valid proof be produced for a signer that was never in the committed tree? Merkle verification bugs are a well-mapped family: unsorted pair handling, second-preimage attacks on internal nodes, proofs accepted at the wrong depth. Any of them ends in wallet takeover, so this went first.

Escape a session. Sessions are meant to be sandboxed: limited targets, limited selectors, limited spend, limited lifetime. Each limit is a boundary to test, and the sharpest question is whether a session can authorise a call that reconfigures the wallet itself. That would turn a temporary permission into a permanent one.

Win the recovery race. Timed recovery is a race by construction. A recovery key becomes usable after a delay, and the real owner is supposed to cancel it if it was not them. So: can the cancel path be blocked, front-run, or griefed?

Replay across chains. Deterministic addresses mean the same wallet exists at the same address on every chain. A signature that does not bind a chain identifier into its domain is a signature that works everywhere it was never meant to.

Scope

47 files: wallet core and factory, configuration and signature verification, the session and permission system, and recovery. Passkeys and social auth sit on top of all of it.

Outcome

No accepted finding.